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ERROR CORRECTION AND DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN IN INVESTOR-STATE
ARBITRATION
Andrea Kupfer Schneider

The current crisis in investor-state arbitration under the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) system is the subject of commentary by both
practitioners and scholars in the field. This Article first reviews the current status of
ICSID arbitration by specifically using the Argentinean cases as examples of the ongoing
legitimacy concerns that many countries have about ICSID. This Article seeks to explain
the current crisis using theories of judicial review to understand how the annulment
committee process and decisions are contributing to this crisis. The judicial theory of
error correction, when utilized to review the recent annulment committee decisions,
illuminates the debate in the appropriate use of the appellate function for ICSID. Then
the Article will use dispute system design theories of legitimacy and sustainability to
suggest potential avenues of moving forward. Through the lens of stakeholder
participation, the Article examines concerns with the law applied by the arbitral
tribunals and the standards of review used by the annulment committees. Finally, the
Article uses dispute system design theory to examine proposals for changing ICSID—
both the law and the process—and argues that any changes must be stakeholder-driven.
The current crisis in investor-state arbitration under the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) system has led to much commentary by both
practitioners and scholars in the field. This Article is a first attempt to organize a variety
of strains of thought using theories of error correction to understand the controversy and
then using dispute system design theory to recommend how ICSID can proceed forward
in considering and adopting reforms to its current structure.
This Article first reviews the current status of ICSID arbitration particularly
focusing on the Argentinean cases1 and the ongoing legitimacy concerns that many Latin
* Professor of Law and Director of the Dispute Resolution Program, Marquette University Law
School. Many thanks to Chad Oldfather, Irene Ten Cate, and Nancy Welsh for their very helpful
comments, and to Katie Lonze and Nida Shakir for excellent research assistance. Thanks also to the
participants at the symposium hosted by the Yearbook on Arbitration and Mediation at Penn State
Dickinson School of Law. This article extends ideas begun in Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Using Dispute
System Design to Add More Process Choices to Investment Treaty Disputes, in Investor-State Disputes:
Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration II 93, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/8 (Susan
Franck and Anna Joubin-Bret, eds., 2011), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20108_en.pdf; Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider,
Becoming “Investor-State Mediation,” 1 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L. AFF. 86 (2012); and particularly Nancy
A. Welsh & Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into International
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
1
Susan D. Franck, The ICSID Effect? Considering Potential Variations in Arbitration Awards, 51 VA.
J. INT’L L. 825, 861 (2011) (energy disputes are the single largest type of disputes under ICSID). See
Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/03, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic (July 30,
2010), available at http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0299.pdf; CMS Gas
Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
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American countries have about ICSID. Second, we turn to theories of appellate function
including error correction and the difference with how error correction does or does not
occur in arbitration settings. Finally, the Article examines how dispute system design
theory would apply to both the critiques and suggestions for the ICSID system.
I.

THE CURRENT ICSID CRISIS
A. The History of ICSID

Member governments of the World Bank ratified the Convention on the
Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States in 1965
and established the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
(“ICSID”) to create an international structure for peaceably resolving investment
disputes.2 Even as governments have tried to create a multilateral system, the bilateral
investment treaty (“BIT”) has thrived.3
BITs were originally designed to provide for equal treatment of foreign
investment—that foreign investors would have the same laws and same rights as the host
country investors.4 BITs also now provide for arbitration under the rules of ICSID, the
additional facility rules of ICSID5 or the United Nations Commission for International
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”).6 Arbitration proponents urge that arbitration has played a
significant role in easing global commerce by: (1) enabling states and investors to resolve
disputes and maintain relationships; (2) providing appropriate remedies to harmed

Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic (Sept. 25, 2007), available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC6
87_En&caseId=C4; Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on
the Argentine Republic's Application for Annulment of the Award (June 29, 2010), available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1
550_En&caseId=C8.
2
See ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules, INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES 5
(April 2006), available at https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf;
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: The Evolution of Dispute Resolution Regimes in International
Trade Organizations, 20 MICH J. INT’L L. 697, 714-19 (1999) (outlining a description of the investor
arbitration regime).
3
Estimates are that over 3000 BITs were signed between 1959 and 2009. See Jeswald Salacuse, The
Emerging Global Regime for Investment, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 427, 428 (2010).
4
Here, we are referencing the history and intent of BITs, not more recent jurisprudence in which the
argument has been made that foreign investors actually are treated better than domestic investors, due to
the right of recourse made available by BITs.
5
If only one state is a member of ICSID, the additional facility rules are also available.
6
See Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration 3, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/11, U.N. Sales No. E.10.II.D.11 (U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. ed., 2010)
[hereinafter Investor-State Disputes], available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia200911_en.pdf; see
also Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID
and MIGA, 1 ICSID REV. 1, n. 1 (1986), cited in Jack J. Coe, Jr., Transparency in the Resolution of
Investor-State Disputes – Adoption, Adaptation, and NAFTA Leadership, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1339, 1345,
n. 32 (2006) [hereinafter Transparency].
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investors; and (3) attracting foreign investment to those states that adhere to the
investment treaty regime.7
Under ICSID arbitration rules, an investor can bring an arbitration claim against a
state for a violation of the operative BIT. For a number of years after its creation,
“ICSID registered less than a handful of cases per year.”8 In the last decade, however,
the number of new cases has risen and “in 2011 alone, thirty-eight new cases were
registered with ICSID.”9 This increase in cases and awards has already increased
scrutiny of ICSID.10 Perhaps as a result of the increased caseload,11 or the heavy costs of
investment treaty arbitration12 or the magnitude of some arbitral awards, stakeholders are
now raising multiple concerns.13

7

See Investor-State Disputes, supra note 6, at 3 (“Host states wishing to attract and promote foreign
investment often seek to offer predictability to foreign investors by favouring international arbitration as
the means for investors to deal with a dispute.”). But see The Role of International Investment Agreements
in Attracting Foreign Direct Investment in Developing Countries, xi, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2009/5, U.N. Sales No. E.09.II.D.20 (U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. ed., 2009)
(“IIAs are part of the policy framework for foreign investment . . . IIAs alone can never be a sufficient
policy instrument to attract FDI [foreign direct investment]”), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/diaeia20095_en.pdf; see also Jason Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment
Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L.
397, 438 (2011) (reporting research suggesting that a nation’s entry into a BIT does not tend to influence
companies’ decisions to invest); Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jennifer L. Tobin, Do BITs Benefit Developing
Countries?, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 131, 134-136 (Catherine A. Rogers & Roger P.
Alford eds., 2009) (concluding that countries with poor investment environments do not benefit
significantly from entering into BITs); Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment
Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1, 13-23 (2007) (surveying empirical research regarding investment
arbitration).
8
Irene M. Ten Cate, International Arbitration and the Ends of Appellate Review, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L.
& POL. 1110, 1173 (2012).
9
Id.
10
See INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES, THE ICSID CASELOAD STATISTICS 13 (2011),
available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument&
CaseLoadStatistics=True&language=English21; see also Jeswald W. Salacuse, Is There A Better Way?
Alternative Methods of Treaty Based Investor-State Dispute Resolution, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 138, 14347 (2007).
11
Significant surges in other contexts have led to similar perceptions of crisis and the need for change.
See e.g., Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1107 (1996)
(noting that surge in asbestos cases may have contributed to a sense that courts were overburdened); Scott
Sigmund Gartner & Gary M. Segura, War, Casualties, and Public Opinion, 42 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 278,
296-99 (1998) (observing that sudden surges in key indicators – e.g., war deaths – cause change in
institutional strategies).
12
See Susan D. Franck, Rationalizing Costs in Investment Treaty Arbitration, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
769, 782-90 (2011) (reporting regarding the costs of investment treaty arbitration); Catherine Rogers, The
Arrival of the “Have-Nots” in International Arbitration, 8 NEV. L. J. 341, 357 (2007) (observing that while
foreign investors have typically hired major international law firms to represent them in investor-state
arbitration, many developing countries have not, due to the expense associated with such representation or
for political reasons).
13
See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 29
(2010);Winslow Christian, Curtis E. von Kann, James M Gaitis & June R. Lehrman, Introduction, in
COLLEGE OF COMMERCIAL ARBITRATORS GUIDE TO BEST PRACTICES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1-5
(Curtis E. von Kann et al. eds., 2d ed. 2010); Salacuse, supra note 10.
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B. The Annulment Procedure of ICSID
The annulment procedure is particularly of note in the recent crisis of confidence
with ICSID.14 Parties who are unhappy with the tribunal’s decision can “appeal” or ask
for a review only under the annulment proceedings set forth in the ICSID convention.15
An annulment request is heard by an ICSID annulment committee. As opposed to the
original arbitration tribunal where each party gets to select its own party arbitrator who
then decide on a third neutral arbitrator, this committee is selected by ICSID.16 ICSID
Convention Article 52(1) sets out the grounds for annulment of an ICSID award: (a) that
the Tribunal was not properly constituted; (b) that the Tribunal has manifestly exceeded
its powers; (c) that there was corruption on the part of a member of the Tribunal; (d) that
there has been a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; or (e) that the
award has failed to state the reasons on which it is based.17 Thus, the scope of the ICSID
annulment committee is ostensibly limited and their decisions are supposed to be solely
based off of procedural errors as oppose to substantive errors. Whether ICSID annulment
committees have gone beyond their scope or have been inconsistent has already been the
subject of much criticism in the past.18 But, the latest series of cases is even more
striking.
C. The Argentina Cases
The cases filed against Argentina illustrate the current crisis with ICSID’s awards
and annulment procedure. In the early 1990s, many foreign corporations invested in
Argentinian companies as Argentina promoted privatization. As part of these
investments, Argentina agreed to stabilize the peso against the dollar by collecting tariffs
in dollars and readjusting the tariff rate twice a year. Foreign investors benefitted
economically from this assurance of a stable tariff. But between 1999 and 2002,
“Argentina experienced an economic meltdown of cataclysmic proportion, precipitated
14

Although this article focuses on the Argentina cases, ICSID has faced other challenges regarding the
annulment procedures. In response to a request from the Philippines, ICSID recently published a
Background Paper on Annulment for the Administrative Council of ICSID (August 10, 2012) outlining the
history of annulment procedures and decisions. See also David Caron, Framing the Work of ICSID
Annulment Committees, 6 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REV. 173 (2012), available at
http://works.bepress.com/david_caron/134/ (reviewing the history of annulments at ICSID and the
percentage of decisions annulled in whole or in part).
15
See David D. Caron, Reputation and Reality in the ICSID Annulment Process: Understanding the
Distinction Between Annulment and Appeal, 7 ICSID FOREIGN INVESTMENT L. J. 21 (1992) (explaining the
importance differences between a judicial appeal as we might think of it and the annulment procedure for
ICSID.)
16
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States
art. 52, March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
17
Id. at art. 52(1); see also W. Michael Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID
Arbitration, 1989 Duke L.J. 739, 754 (1989).
18
See Gloria Maria Alvarez, The ICSID Procedure: Mind the Gap, 10 REVISTA E-MERCATORIA 164,
181-90 (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1987236 (discussing the history of ICSID annulment
committees); Susan D. Franck, The Nature and Enforcement of Investor Rights Under Investment Treaties:
Do Investment Treaties Have a Bright Future, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 47, 59-70 (2005). See
also Reisman, supra note 17, at 785-888.
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by an exploding budget deficit, a balance of payments crisis, and mounting foreign
debt.”19 In response to the crisis, the government of Argentina passed an emergency law
suspending both the favorable conversion ratio and the semi-annual adjustments.
Specifically, Argentina devalued the peso significantly, by “terminating the currency
board that pegged the peso to the U.S. dollar, the pesification of all financial obligations,
and the effective freezing of all bank accounts.”20 Investors argued that Argentina
“violated several obligations under the BIT, including obligations to accord fair and
equitable treatment to investments and to honor commitments made to investors.”21
When investors sued Argentina, Argentina argued that it was not liable as the
global economic downturn permitted Argentina to use emergency clauses under the BIT
agreement. Even though these emergency clauses are available in most BITs, this was
the first time a State pleaded the defense.22 Specifically, as these cases evolved,
Argentina made a two-pronged argument for necessity: first, that its response to the
crisis was protected under the BIT’s non-precluded measures (NPM). The NPM clause is
a standard provision in BITs that exempt state action “when it is necessary for the
maintenance of public order.”23 This clause is not further clarified or interpreted in the
BIT. A second prong—and one used by arbitral tribunals to interpret the NPM clause as
well—is the necessity defense under customary international law as reflected in Article
25 of the International Law Commission’s Article on State Responsibility. 24 The
necessity clause is an “exceptional clause available to a state if it is the only means for
the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.”25 The
necessity defense is not available where there exists any other means, including those
means which are more costly or less convenient.26 Thus, the question for the arbitral
panels is whether Argentina took measures that infringed more on the investor’s rights
than necessary for Argentina to achieve its goals.27 While these prongs are ostensibly
separate standards—one under treaty law and one under customary law—some tribunals
have conflated the interpretations.
A review of each of the cases involving U.S. investors28 and their annulment
committee decisions demonstrates the confusion in both applying the original legal
19

Alec Stone Sweet, Investor-State Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 LAW & ETHICS
HUM. RTS. 47, 69 (2010).
20
William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The
Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitrations, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 283, 290 (2010). See also David
Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation for
Conflicting Outcomes, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383, 387 (2010).
21
Ten Cate, supra note 8, at 1175.
22
Sweet, supra note 19, at 70.
23
Treaty with Argentina Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of Investment,
U.S.-Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, S. TREATY DOC. No. 103-2 (1993).
24
Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, 53d Sess., Apr. 23-June 1, July 2-Aug. 10, 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10.
25
Schneiderman, supra note 20, at 388.
26
Id.
27
Sweet, supra note 19, at 70; Michael Wilson, Note, The Enron v. Argentina Annulment Decision:
Moving a Bishop Vertically in the Precarious ICSID System, 43 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 347, 351
(2012) (quoting the ILC and also calling this the “only way” provision).
28
This article focuses on the U.S. investors for clarity as all five cases were heard under the identical
BIT. Nonetheless, cases involving other countries’ BIT’s were also occurring and provide similar lessons.
See Diane A. Desierto, ICESCR Minimum Core Obligations and Investment: Recasting the Non-
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standards as well as the proper standard of review by the annulment committee. ICSID
tribunals issued five awards –CMS, Enron, Sempra, LG&E, and Continental Casualty. In
three of the five, the arbitral tribunals ordered Argentina to pay more than $100 million
each in damages.29 The first case was CMS v. Argentina in 2005 in which the tribunal
awarded CMS $133.2 million. In addition, Argentina was to transfer ownership shares
for an additional sum of $2,148,000. In the next case in May 2007, the Sempra tribunal
ordered Argentina to pay the claimant compensation in the amount of $128.3 million.
Finally, in September 2007, in Enron v. Argentina, the tribunal awarded the claimants
compensation in the amount of $106.2 million.30
The CMS tribunal interpreted the BIT emergency clause Article XI through the
lens of customary international law on necessity. It found that while the BIT should take
precedence over more general rules of customary international law, Article XI lacked
sufficient clarity to be evaluated independently. CMS had relied on Argentina’s business
and legal environment in the gas sector for purposes of investment. Thus, the CMS
tribunal found that by altering the business and legal environment in the gas sector,
Argentina breached its obligation of according fair and equitable treatment to foreign
investors. Argentina did not provide CMS with a stable and predictable investment
climate required under the BIT.31 The CMS tribunal came under sustained attack for its
application of the necessity defense and its finding that if there were any other option
available to the government, it could not claim a defense of necessity.32
The Enron tribunal found that Argentina could not claim that it could escape the
terms of its contract with Enron by arguing that its actions against the company were
made out of necessity (as understood in customary international law). The tribunal
explained that in order to argue necessity under customary international law, Argentina's
decision to restructure the terms of its contract with Enron in the wake of the late 1990s
financial crisis would have to have been the "only way for the State to safeguard an
essential interest against a grave and imminent peril.”33 According to the tribunal,
Argentina did not satisfy this condition, as there were other approaches available that the
Expropriation Compensation Model During Financial Crises, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV 473, 479
(2012) (outlining the Argentine cases and the standard of damages used in each case).
29
See CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award 139
para.2-4 (May 12, 2005), 44 ILM 1205 (2005); Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic's Application for Annulment of the Award, 47 (June
29, 2010), available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1
550_En&caseId=C8; Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, 140 (Sept.
5, 2008), available at http://italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0228.pdf; Enron Creditors
Recovery Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/03,
Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, 169 (July 30, 2010), available at
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0299.pdf.
30
Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. The Argentina Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/01/03, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, 1, 19 (July 30,
2010), available at http://italaw.com/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf.
31
CMS Gas Transmission Co., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Award at para. 126, 275 & 281.
32
Schneiderman, supra note 20, at 390 n. 53 (citing August Reinisch, Necessity in International
Investment Arbitration-- An Unnecessary Split of Opinions in Recent ICSID Cases? Comments on CMS v.
Argentina and LG&E v. Argentina, 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 191, 200 (2007) (making the
necessity defense “practically unavailable”).
33
Id.
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country could have taken to address its economic crisis. In the words of one
commentator, the Enron tribunal rejected the necessity defense, “paying only lip service
to the economic hardship experienced by ordinary Argentinians.”34
These three cases ended up being the high water mark for investor protection.
Annulment committees and subsequent arbitral tribunals started to find in favor of
Argentina.35 First, the tribunal in LG&E in June 2007 found that Argentina was excused
for paying damages during the State of Necessity (approximately eighteen months) as
contemplated by the emergency clauses under the BIT. Damages of $57 million were
awarded only for the period after 2003-2005.36 Next, the annulment committee for CMS
v. Argentina in September 2007 started to discuss the problems in the legal reasoning in
the arbitral award for CMS. The annulment committee declined to annul the tribunal's
award in full, noting that its "limited jurisdiction" prevented it from annulling the award.
However, the committee stated that “the Tribunal made a manifest error of law [by]
simply assuming that Article XI and Article 25 are on the same footing."37 Further, the
committee declined to find a failure to state reasons on this particular issue under Article
52(1)(e). It did note that the tribunal's analysis on Article XI and Article 25, "should
certainly have been more explicit" in its discussion.38 Although the annulment committee
let the award stand, this critique effectively annulled it. As one commentator noted, “the
decision effectively tainted the legitimacy of the CMS tribunal award, making it
politically unappealing, and thus unlikely, that Argentina would comply with the $133.2
million judgment.”39
Then, in Continental Casualty v. The Argentine Republic,40 decided in 2008,
Argentina was ordered to pay (only) $2.8 million plus interest for a relatively minor
transgression of the BIT. By 2010, the tide had definitely turned. In the annulment
decision for Sempra v. Argentina,41 the committee annulled the award in full because the
34

Schneiderman, supra note 20, at 391-92.
Wilson, supra note 27, at 356; see also Schneiderman, supra note, 20 at 388.
36
See, e.g., LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E Int’l Inc. v. Argentine Republic,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1. Although an annulment request was filed in 2008, the parties agreed to
suspend the proceeding which is its current status.
37
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, Decision on Application for
Annulment (Sept. 25, 2007), available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC5
04_En&caseId=C4. The history of the drafting of ICSID demonstrates that this interpretation would be
appropriate if the states had understood these laws to be different. The Background Paper on Annulment
for the Administrative Council of ICSID notes that in Legal Committee meetings held in 1964, Chairman
Aron Broches confirmed that, “failure to apply to proper law could amount to an excess of power if the
parties had agreed on an applicable law.” ICSID Report at para. 26, p. 10.
38
Id. (Stating that the “Committee cannot simply substitute its own view of the law and its own
appreciation of the facts for those of the Tribunal…Although applying [Article XI] cryptically and
defectively, it applied it. There is accordingly no manifest excess of powers”).
39
Dohyun Kim, The Annulment Committee’s Role in Multiplying Inconsistency in ICSID Arbitration:
The Need to Move Away From an Annulment-Based System, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 273 (2011).
40
See generally, Cont’l Cas. Co. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on
the Application for Partial Annulment of Continental Casualty Company and the Application for Partial
Annulment of the Argentine Republic (Sept. 16, 2011), available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2
291_En&caseId=C13.
41
Sempra Energy Int’l v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/06, Decision on
Annulment (June 29, 2010), available at
35
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tribunal manifestly exceeded its power when it failed to apply Article XI of the USArgentina BIT. In doing so, the committee said that the tribunal “failed altogether to
apply the applicable law” and failed to enter into a discussion of where to draw the line
between annullable and non-annullable errors of law.42 The Sempra committee used the
same rationale as the CMS committee and affirmed that, generally, treaty law is superior
to customary law. Additionally, the committee noted that Article XI and the necessity
defense serve different purposes. Article XI defines the boundaries for when actions
under the treaty would not be invalid. The necessity defense only applies when a party
actually commits an infringement. Lastly, the necessity defense and Article XI have
material differences, so the necessity defense should not be used to interpret Article XI.
As such, the Sempra committee expressly held that the tribunal made a fundamental error
when identifying and applying the correct law, which was a manifest excess of its powers
and the entirety of the award was annulled.43 The Enron award was also annulled and the
minimal award for Continental Casualty was sustained all along similar lines.

https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1
550_En&caseId=C8 [hereinafter Sempra Annulment].
42
Id. at para. 165.
43
Id. at para. 208-09.

201

202

One of the key issues stemming from the tide of cases out of the Argentinean
crisis is the lack of consistency in the holdings.44 The facts are virtually the same in all
cases. They arise from the same economic crisis and the same governmental response.
It is perhaps understandable that some variation might arise out of different BIT
agreements where the clauses for different countries could vary slightly.45 Yet in the
Argentina cases, the sheer number of cases has highlighted this concern with
inconsistency more clearly. The conflicting outcomes thus far have obviously not
alleviated this problem. While ICSID has faced this critique before in terms of annulment
gone amuck,46 the concern with overreaching or under-reaching by the annulment
committees is at a peak.
Stemming from the confusion and unhappiness with the awards against Argentina
and other Latin American countries, states in that region have reacted strongly. The
growing resistance to ICSID from Latin American countries focuses on four primary
arguments: (i) ICSID awards are not subject to appeal [just annulment committees]; (ii)
the fact that the vast majority of ICSID awards have been decided in favor of the private
investors shows that the system lacks neutrality and impartiality; (iii) only companies
may sue at this forum [states may not bring claims—they can only defend them]; and (iv)
the cost to litigate these claims is very high.47 Bolivia and Ecuador have withdrawn in
whole or in part from the ICSID,48 Argentina has not paid any award against it,49 and
unrest continues.50 Such opposition and the implementation of threats of non-compliance
44

See Ten Cate, supra note 8, at 1180; see also Irene Ten Cate, The Costs of Consistency: Precedent in
Investment Treaty Arbitration 51 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 418, 427-435 (2013).
45
This is at least one of the explanations given for the different outcomes in the Lauder cases where
the outcomes varied. In Lauder v. Czech Republic under the US-Czech BIT, with Lauder in an individual
capacity, and under ICSID, the tribunal found that the Czech Republic had not expropriated Lauder’s media
licenses. In CME v. Czech Republic under the Netherlands-Czech BIT, with Lauder represented through
his parent company, and under the UNCITRAL rules, the arbitral tribunal found that the Czech Republic
had violated the BIT and awarded damages of $270 million plus interest. Compare Franck, supra note 18,
at 60–61 (discussing the Lauder awards as examples of inconsistency), with Jan Paulsson, Avoiding
Unintended Consequences, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES 241, 249
(Karl P. Sauvant & Michael Chiswick-Patterson eds., 2008) (arguing that the different outcomes can be
attributed to the tribunals’ assessment of the facts, and that the awards are not inconsistent in a meaningful
sense because “[t]heir understanding of the relevant legal standards . . . were perfectly congruent”).
46
See Reisman, supra note 17.
47
Ignacio A. Vincentelli, The Uncertain Future of ICSID In Latin America, 16 LAW & BUS. REV. AM.
409, 422-23 (2010).
48
Id. at 425; see also Nicolle E. Kownacki, Prospects for ICSID Arbitration in Post-Denunciation
Countries: An ‘Updated’ Approach, 15 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 529 (2010) (outlined what can
happen in Bolivia and Ecuador under ICSID in the future.)
49
Argentina reportedly took the position that CMS had to seek enforcement in the Argentine courts,
which CMS refused. Luke E. Peterson, Argentine Crisis Arbitration Awards Pile Up, but Investors Still
Wait for a Payout, LAW.COM (June 25, 2009), http://justinvestment.org/2009/07/argentine-crisis-arbitrationawards-pile-up-but-investors-still-wait-for-a-payout. CMS eventually transferred the award to Blue Ridge
Investments, a subsidiary of Bank of America. Argentina’s failure to pay the CMS award and a second final
ICSID award in favor of another American investor, Azurix Corp., has now resulted in political sanctions.
On March 26, 2012, President Barack Obama announced a suspension of Argentina’s trade benefits under
the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences program due to its failure to pay the awards. Doug Palmer,
Obama Says to Suspend Trade Benefits for Argentina, REUTERS.COM (Mar. 26, 2012),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/26/us-usa-argentina-trade-idUSBRE82P0QX20120326.
50
Vincentelli, supra note 47; Leah D. Harhay, Investment Arbitration in 2012: A Look to Diversity and
Consistency, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 89, 89-90 (2011); Investor-State Disputes, supra note 6, at 15-16; Franck,
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have the potential to inject substantial uncertainty about the sustainability of the current
system of international investment and trade. Rebuilding the legitimacy of the ICSID
system is crucial for the long term prospects of the foreign investment system.51
II. USING THEORIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW TO UNDERSTAND THE ICSID ANNULMENT
CRISIS
Adjudicatory structures generally include an appeals function.52 In understanding
the choices that arbitration makes in general, and ICSID in particular, to balance finality
as a value against that of accuracy,53 we need to understand what values an appeals
system can promote. The appellate review function has been characterized as “derivative
dispute resolution” in which courts have the opportunity to correct an error in the lower
courts.54 Furthermore, the measures of success outlined in dispute system design theory
discussed further later in the article—legitimacy and sustainability—equally apply to an
adjudicatory system like that of ICSID. As Judge Posner put it:
[M]any of the decisions that constitute the output of a court system cannot
be shown to be either ‘good’ or ‘bad’, whether in terms of consequences
or of other criteria, so it is natural to ask whether there are grounds for
confidence in the design of the institution and in the competence and
integrity of the judges who operate it.55
Under derivative dispute resolution theory discussed above, this secondary
dispute—as to whether the lower court got it right—is a derivate dispute between the
parties that is linked but not exactly the same as the primary dispute between the parties.
When courts address this derivative dispute, courts are tasked with potentially refining
the law and reviewing the lower court for error (what has also been called the “guidance”

supra note 7, at 64-65; see also Denunciation of the ICSID Convention and BITs: Impact on Investor-State
Claims, U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev. IIA Issues Note No. 2, at 4-5 U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IIA/2010/2 (Dec. 2010) (describing withdrawal of Bolivia and Ecuador from ICSID
and Ecuador’s termination of several bilateral investment treaties), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20106_en.pdf.
51
Franck, supra note 1, at 844-849 (outlining the parameters of the current crisis.) See, e.g., ERNSTULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATT/WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM XIV-XV, 3-4 (1997) (regarding noncompliance with arbitral awards arising out of the GATT and subsequent replacement with WTO system).
Threats of non-compliance certainly are not new, or even unique to international arbitration. See Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (In the U.S., the famous case of Marbury v. Madison involved a freshlyminted Supreme Court similarly struggling to establish its legal and political authority while also
acknowledging its dependence on the enforcement power wielded by the executive branch of government).
52
See generally Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century View, 38 S.C.L.
REV. 411, 428-429 (1987).
53
Thomas W. Walsh, Note, Substantive Review of ICSID Awards: Is the Desire for Accuracy Sufficient
to Compromise Finality, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 444 (2006); Erin Gleason, International Arbitral
Appeals: What Are We So Afraid Of?, 7 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 269 (2007).
54
Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L. J. 49 (2010).
55
Id. at 85 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 3(2008)).
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function versus the “correctness” function).56 Scholars have debated extensively the
nature and proper bounds of the mechanisms by which appellate courts create and refine
law.57 For our purposes here, we need not address this issue as annulment committees
are clearly not supposed to create law in any way.58 Yet the second function of appeals—
that of error correction—is something that arguably applies in the arbitration context.59
Professor Oldfather outlines that error correction generally occurs in one of four (often
linked) categories: correcting injustice; correcting mistakes; promoting uniform law
application; and reviewing the lower court processes.60 These four categories can be used
to analyze the Argentina cases and help shed light on the frustration and concern
regarding these awards and decisions.
A. Correcting Injustice
A common theory of how appellate courts operate is that appellate courts ensure
that trial level courts do not commit injustice and that the result at the trial level is a “fair”
one. Under this theory, appellate courts focus on the correctness of the outcome itself—
did the “right” party prevail? Even if one assumes the appellate court finds itself
constrained to refrain from de novo review,61 the court’s focus on justice could affect the
implementation of “procedural” error. In other words, the court might use a lower
standard of review for outcomes it agreed with and a higher standard of review when it
thought that the correct party prevailed.62 Similarly, the “harmless error” standard could
shift. For an outcome with which the appellate court agreed, even a procedural error
could be categorized as “harmless” so that the substantive outcome would stand.
In ICSID, the annulment committee is not supposed to examine the result of the
arbitral tribunal. No standard outlined in ICSID refers to the correctness or fairness of
the outcome. And yet, arguably, the use of this standard is exactly from where the
current crisis stems. Commentators who argue that ICSID is biased against the state,63 or
that investors should share in the pain of Argentina’s crisis believe that the tribunals
finding against Argentina must be reviewed for fairness.64 Furthermore, it appears that
56

David P. Leonard, The Correctness Function of Appellate Decision-Making: Judicial Obligation in
an Era of Fragmentation, 17 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 299, 302 (1984).
57
See, e.g., Adam A. Milani & Michael R. Smith, Playing God: A Critical Look at Sua Sponte
Decisions by Appellate Courts, 69 TENN. L. REV. 245 (2002); see also Oldfather, supra note 54 at 50.
58
Alvarez, supra note 18 (annulment decisions are supposed to concern procedural legitimacy while an
appeal decision also reviews the substantive accuracy). But see S. Bhushan, Re-Discovering the Role of the
Annulment Committee in Shaping International Investment Law Jurisprudence, NALSAR University of
Law, working paper (2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2027781
(arguing that the ICSID annulment committees shape international investment law).
59
Anna-Rose Mathieson & Samuel R. Gross, Review for Error, 2 LAW PROBABILITY & RISK 259
(2003) (reviewing the theory versus practice of error correction at the appellate level in the U.S. and our
ambivalence about the importance of accuracy.).
60
Oldfather, supra note 54, at 59-62.
61
Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308 (2009) (explaining the
tension between the theory of universal de novo review and the reality of appellate deference and
avoidance).
62
Oldfather, supra note 54, at 59.
63
Schneiderman, supra note 20, at 387.
64
Id.
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the harsh and public response to earlier panel awards like CMS or Enron affected how the
annulment committees for both Continental as well as Sempra used the nominally neutral
procedural review to arrive at a more just result.65 Not surprisingly, from the arbitration
purists and investor-side counsel, this latter legal analysis has come under grave attack.66
B. Correcting Legal and Factual Mistakes
A second, and more limited, theory of how appellate courts act is one in which the
appellate court reviews the lower court only to correct errors made by mistake. As
Professor Oldfather notes, this narrower focus means that the appellate court will
potentially focus on particular issues rather than the entire case result.67 For example, if
the wrong evidence is admitted, the appellate court would first examine whether there
was a mistake in the legal standard applied and then, second, whether this affected the
verdict. Of course, as Professor Oldfather notes, this standard could also be relatively
malleable to achieve the result desired at the lower court.
The ICSID standard of annulment most closely linked to this theory of error
correction would either be that the tribunal exceeded its powers (by not applying the
correct legal standard)68 or failed to state its reasons69 (and therefore there is no way to
confirm that the legal analysis was not mistaken).70 Interestingly, and similar to domestic
standards of arbitration annulment,71 factual mistake is not sufficient to annul an
arbitration award.
The annulment committees that appear to be using this standard were the Enron
and Sempra committees, which found that the lack of application of the BIT emergency
defense—separate from the necessity defense under customary international law—was a
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Sempra Energy Int’l v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine
Republic's Application for Annulment of the Award, 74 (June 10, 2010). Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Argentine
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Award, (Sept. 5, 2008).
66
Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 20, at 297-302.
67
Oldfather, supra note 54, at 59.
68
Sempra Energy Int’l, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on the Argentine Republic's Application
for Annulment of the Award, at 218.
69
Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/03, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, 220, 405 (July 30,
2010).
70
Many scholars have argued that the process of writing the opinion and putting ones reasoning into
writing is a crucial activity of judges that also improves judicial reasoning. See, e.g., Chad M. Oldfather,
Remedying Judicial Inactivism: Opinions as Informational Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 780 (2006);
Mary M. Ross, Reflection on Appellate Courts: An Appellate Advocate’s Thoughts for Judges, 8 J. APP.
PRAC. & PROCESS 355, 365 (2006) (arguing that judges have a responsibility to advocates that includes
acknowledging and reflecting their arguments in the opinion).
71
See 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006); UNIF. ARB. ACT: VACATING AWARDS § 23 (2000); United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T.
2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38; Flexible Mfg. Sys. Pty. Ltd. v. Super Prods. Corp., 86 F.3d 96, 100 (7th Cir. 1996)
(“factual or legal errors by arbitrators—even clear or gross errors—do not authorize courts to annul
awards”).
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manifest excess of powers on the part of the tribunal.72 Even the CMS annulment
committee, which upheld the arbitral award, sharply criticized the CMS panel’s decision.
Throughout its consideration of the Award, the Committee has identified a
series of errors and defects. The Award contained manifest errors of law.
It suffered from lacunae and elisions. All this has been identified and
underline by the Committee. However the Committee is conscious that it
exercises its jurisdiction under a narrow and limited mandate. . . .73
Of course, this willingness to criticize, even when upholding the award, has come
under much attack. First, it makes it highly unlikely that the Argentinean government
will ever actually pay an award that the ICSID annulment committee has said is riddled
with errors.74 Second, this restraint in not overturning the arbitral award itself is really
not that restrained at all given the extensive dicta in the annulment committee’s opinion.75
As Professor Oldfather hypothesized appellate courts might do, the annulment
committees expansively used their procedural rules in order to correct what it saw as a
significant and serious legal error.76 This expansive use has also come under much
attack.77
C. Ensuring Uniform Application of the Law
A third function of appellate courts could be seen as ensuring that lower courts
apply the law uniformly—that all lower courts interpret the law similarly and that all
cases are being measured against the same law. Of course, there are different parties and
different facts in each case so the goal for appellate courts is that “courts strive to achieve
uniformity with respect to treatment of the significant, rule-triggering facts. . . .”78
In contrast, uniformity is not written into any standard of review for arbitration.
Inconsistency is seen as a distinct possibility in arbitration with the ability of individual
arbitrators to apply the law to each particular set of facts unconcerned with uniformity per
se.79 Error in the application of law, as we have seen above, is not a ground for
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Enron Creditors Recovery Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/03, Decision on the Application for
Annulment of the Argentine Republic, at 349; Sempra Energy Int’l, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision
on the Argentine Republic's Application for Annulment of the Award, at 74. See generally Jeffrey W.
Stempel, Asymmetric Dynamism and Acceptable Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 5 PENN ST. Y.B.
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Oldfather, supra note 54, at 84-85.
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Caron, supra note 15, at 187-89 (outlining several different theories as to why annulment
committees have tendencies to go beyond their narrow procedural limits of review).
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Oldfather, supra note 54, at 61.
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consistency in ICSID awards.)
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annulment. Similarly, lack of adherence to a uniform standard (should there even be one)
would also not be grounds for annulment.80
And yet much of the concern and criticism in the Argentinean crisis is located in
this function—different arbitral tribunals have applied the same law differently and even
the annulment committees have interpreted the law differently. In fact, the Enron
annulment committee stressed that it fell to the tribunals to develop a consistent body of
law:
[T]he role of an ad hoc committee is a limited one, re-stricted to assessing
the legitimacy of the award and not its correctness . . . . The annulment
mechanism is not designed to bring about consistency in the interpretation
and application of international investment law. The responsibility for
ensuring consistency in the jurisprudence and for building a coherent body
of law rests primarily with the investment tribunals. They are assisted in
their task by the development of a common legal opinion and the
progressive emergence of “une jurisprudence constante.”81
With the same facts precipitating over 40 arbitration cases against Argentina, the
lack of uniform law or application is starker than might otherwise be the case in typical
arbitration scenarios.82 This lack of consistency undermines the overall legitimacy of the
ICSID system by forcing one to question either the early tribunals who found Argentina
liable or the latter annulment committees who found the original reasoning incorrect.83
D. Review of Lower-Court Processes
The last function of appellate courts in error correction is the one focused on
procedure.84 The appellate court examines the procedural choices made at the lower
court level—witnesses, evidence, etc.—and does not examine the substantive ruling.
This last type of review is commonly called procedural review.
It is here that arbitration annulment standards typically focus and ICSID is no
exception. The query of whether the tribunal is properly constituted, whether the
arbitrators are corrupt, and whether there has been a departure from a procedural rule are
all specific standards that fit within the review of procedure.85 None of the Argentina
80

Kim, supra note 39, at 261 (arguing that the annulment committee’s procedures require the
committee to refrain from a substantive review of the law and, therefore, limit the ability to provide for
coherent and consistent law).
81
Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. & Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/03, Decision on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine Republic, 65 (July 30, 2010).
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Caron, supra note 15 at 189, 191 (outlining why the annulment committees concern with consistency
and accuracy might explain their willingness to review the substantive merits of the claims).
83
Kim, supra note 39, at 255-56 (outlining social legitimacy as decisions that are perceived as justified
and that states accept are justified). For an argument as to why inconsistency in the Argentina cases can be
valued, see Ten Cate, supra note 79, at 469-471.
84
Oldfather, supra note 54, 61-63.
85
Burke-White & von Staden, supra note 20, at 297-301. This is not to ignore a separate concern in
terms of the composition of the tribunals and committees. See Shauhin A. Talesh, How Dispute Resolution
System Design Matters: An Organizational Analysis of Dispute Resolution Structures and Consumer
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cases have been annulled using these standards. Arguably, even the two other guidelines
on manifestly exceeding its powers and requirement to state the reasons for the award are
procedural standards. However, the ICSID annulment committees have used these latter
two standards, as explained above, to engage in a more substantive review of the case.
III. USING DISPUTE SYSTEM DESIGN TO MOVE FORWARD
The theories behind dispute system design are a combination of conflict theory,
organizational behavior, and alternative dispute resolution that have now been applied to
everything from creating in-house corporate dispute resolution systems to mass tort
claims to human rights courts.86 Dispute system design theorists outline the qualities that
Lemon Laws, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 463, 474-75(2012). As many have argued, the arbitrators in the
ICSID context are a narrow group of experts, grounded in commercial law, with little appreciation for the
nuances of public or international law. In a study of the actual arbitrators serving on the tribunals and
panels, David Schneiderman examined four different theories based in political science literature to see if
any of these theories could explain the otherwise conflicting and contradictory decisions. Comparing the
social background model (decisions are based on where and how adjudicators grow up and receive their
professional training); the attitudinal model (decisions are based on the political affiliation of the
adjudicator); the strategic model (decisions are based on goals bounded by the institution and the behavior
of other adjudicators); and new institutionalism (decisions are both enabled and constrained by institutions,
including other actors, legal norms, and expectations). Schneiderman argues that this last theory can
explain how the investment regime’s “structural tilt ensures that arbitral choices will be more likely to
favor investment promotion over the interests of state parties who wish to pursue countervailing social
policy initiatives. . . .” Schneiderman, supra note 20, at 410-11. As he notes, the arbitrators are drawn
from the world of international commercial arbitration into investor-state arbitration. See Harhay, supra
note 50, at 93-93 (outlining that of the four Argentina cases—CMS, Enron, Sempra and LG&E—three
arbitrators (Orrego Vicuna, Mark Lalone, and Albert van den Berg) each sat on two of them). When the
decisions then differed in result, confusion about this was even more problematic. See also Franck, supra
note 1, at 861-64 (arguing that ICSID is not significantly different than other arbitral forums concerning
energy or Latin America). The procedural differences—where commercial arbitration is conducted
privately, ad hoc, with little national oversight or publicity—would be quite different from the pressures
and the reality of the Argentinean economic crisis. Schneiderman hypothesizes that the arbitration bar’s
very defensiveness to the attacks after the Argentina decisions reflects their unawareness of the complex
and public situation in which they found themselves. Schneiderman, supra note 20, at 412. Similarly, the
structure of ICSID itself could perpetuate this anti-public law bias. See Harhay, supra note 50, at 90-92;
see also Wilson, supra note 27, at 361-63.
86
First popularized in the book, Getting Disputes Resolved in 1988, dispute system design presents a
practical and thoughtful approach to organizational disputes that has now been through several evolutions.
See generally, WILLIAM URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO CUT THE
COSTS OF CONFLICT (1st ed.1988). Originally, designers focused on structures that would require
disputants to move up a disputing pyramid—that is resolving most disputes by using interests, then relying
on rights, then moving to assertions of power only for the most intransigent and difficult disputes. Id. at 42.
(In their book, Ury, Brett, and Goldberg outline six key principles for designing a presumptively interestsoriented dispute resolution system: (1) put the focus on interests; (2) build in opportunities to return (or
“loop-back”) to negotiations(“Loop-backs” are defined as the opportunity to continue to move around in
the process choices. So, for example, the parties should be able to go back and negotiate at any stage
outlined in a dispute resolution process and not be limited to a “negotiation” stage that occurs early on.
Similarly, the term “loop forward,” developed in later dispute system design literature, also means that
parties can choose to jump around among the process choices choosing to engage, for example, in factfinding before negotiation.) (3) provide low-cost rights and power backups to interest-based processes; (4)
build in consultation before creating the dispute system and feedback after the implementation and use of
the system; (5) arrange procedures in a low-to-high-cost sequence; and (6) provide the necessary
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usually distinguish effective systems: stakeholders have participated in designing them,
the systems are fluid and flexible, and the system is transparent and accountable.87
Organizations can gauge their success by measuring efficiency, effectiveness, and
satisfaction.88
The initial focus of dispute system design theory—on how to establish systems
with multiple process options—will not be addressed in this Article. I have elsewhere
discussed the different process options that could exist in the investor treaty context.89
Instead, we will use the focus on how different dispute system design theorists have
measured success and undertake analysis using their framework. Susskind, for example,
highlights fairness, efficiency, stability and wisdom. Costantino and Merchant focus on
efficiency, effectiveness, and satisfaction. Under either framework, the current system of
motivation, skills, and resources to permit participants and the organization to begin with a focus on
interests and then move to assertions of rights and power only as necessary). The second generation of
dispute system design, primarily highlighted by Cathy Costantino and Christina Sickles-Merchant’s book,
Designing Conflict Management Systems, more specifically discusses how ADR methods can be brought
into an organization in advance of a particular conflict. See generally CATHY A. COSTANTINO &
CHRISTINA SICKLES-MERCHANT, DESIGNING CONFLICT MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 52, 120-121 (1st.
ed.1996). The book also examines how these new systems were developed, noting that some organizational
leaders had used rights-based mechanisms to impose interest-based processes upon stakeholders.
Costantino and Merchant outline their principles as: (1) developing guidelines for whether ADR is
appropriate; (2) tailoring the ADR process to the particular problem; (3) building in preventative methods
of ADR; (4) making sure that disputants have the necessary knowledge and skill to choose and use ADR;
(5) creating ADR systems that are simple to use and easy to access and that resolve disputes early, at the
lowest organizational level, with the least bureaucracy; and (6) allowing disputants to retain maximum
control over the choice of ADR method and selection of neutral wherever possible. Now in the “next
generation” phase of dispute system design, commentators have coalesced around several factors that
highlight the best systems: (1) multiple process options for parties, including rights-based and interestbased processes; (2) ability for parties to “loop back” and “loop forward” between these process options;
(3) substantial stakeholder involvement in the system’s design; (3) participation that is voluntary,
confidential and assisted by impartial third party neutrals; (4) system transparency and accountability; and
(6) education and training of stakeholders on the use of available process options. Stephanie Smith & Janet
Martinez, An Analytic Framework for Dispute Systems Design, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 123, 128 (2009);
Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Natalie Fleury, There’s No Place Like Home: Applying Dispute Systems
Design Theory to Create a Foreclosure Mediation System, 11 NEV. L.J. 368 (2011) (applying Dispute
System Design to foreclosure mediation structure); Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Intersection of Dispute
Systems Design and Transitional Justice, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 289 (2009) (applying Dispute System
Design to human rights violations).
87
Smith & Martinez, supra note 86, at 128.
88
See Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before You Leap and Keep On Looking: Lessons from
the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 425-429 (2005) (It may be
worthwhile to note that McAdoo and Welsh proposed a framework for evaluation that included efficient
justice, substantive justice and procedural justice). See also Jeanne M. Brett, Stephen B. Goldberg, and
William L. Ury, Designing Systems for Resolving Disputes in Organizations, 45 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 162,
169 (1990) (exploring the relevance of procedural justice to dispute system design, in terms of “incentives
associated with process”).
89
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Using Dispute System Design to Add More Process Choices to Investment
Treaty Disputes, in Investor-State Disputes: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration II 93, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/WEB/DIAE/IA/2010/8 (Susan Franck and Anna Joubin-Bret, eds., 2011), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/webdiaeia20108_en.pdf; see also Nancy A. Welsh & Andrea K. Schneider,
Becoming “Investor-State Mediation,” 1 PENN. ST. J. L. & INT’L. AFF. 86 (2012); Nancy A. Welsh &
Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Thoughtful Integration of Mediation into International Investment Treaty
Arbitration, 17 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) [hereinafter Thoughtful Integration ].
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ICSID dispute resolution is not working successfully, primarily because of concerns of
legitimacy—in process and in outcome. This focus on legitimacy of the system ties
directly into its sustainability. As Kim notes, since the power exercised by the arbitral
tribunals takes place in the public sphere and molds the behavior of state entities, we look
for the same indicia of legitimacy and accountability as any other public law adjudicatory
body.90 Particularly with a voluntary system in which sovereign states can choose to sign
BITs or adhere to the investor arbitration system, the perception of legitimacy is crucial.
Furthermore, concepts grounded in dispute system design can be used to assess the
different types of justice that different structures can provide.91
For the purposes of this analysis, two key principles of dispute system design will
be used to analyze the ICSID system. First, we have already used the concept of
accountability to assess ICSID’s dispute resolution process. A system is accountable
when its opinions are understood to be correct and that there exists a reasoned way to
correct errors.92 Now, we will address the issue of stakeholder participation in a system.
For ICSID, we will examine what stakeholders believed they were agreeing to when
signing onto these treaties—what was the applicable law under which disputes were to be
resolved and, second, what was the applicable process used to resolve these disputes,
including any appeal or annulment proceedings.
Participation in a dispute resolution process—adjudicatory or consensual—ties
directly into theories of procedural justice. ICSID’s adjudicatory process was established
by a consensual process so concerns of procedural justice resonate at two levels.
Empirical research reveals that decision-making and dispute resolution procedures are
most likely to be effective if they are perceived as procedurally fair. 93 If parties perceive
a dispute resolution or decision-making process as procedurally fair, they are more likely
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Kim, supra note 39, at 255 (arguing that judicialization of the ICSID system is a good thing since it
provides for more of these checks and balances that are required in the public law sector).
91
See generally Lisa Blomgren Bingham, Designing Justice: Legal Institutions and Other Systems for
Managing Conflict, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1 (2008).
92
In addition, as Judge Posner notes above, a system must also be accountable in terms of its decisionmakers. Arguments about bias of the arbitrators—based on their past experience and/or education—would
fall under the category of accountability.
93
Much of this discussion on procedural justice relating to ICSID has been more extensively outlined
in Welsh & Schneider, Thoughtful Integration, supra note 89. Professor Welsh has examined procedural
justice extensively, in a variety of settings. See e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Donna Stienstra & Bobbi McAdoo,
The Application of Procedural Justice Research to Judicial Actions and Techniques in Settlement Sessions,
in THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Tania Sourdin & Archie
Zariski, eds.) (forthcoming 2013) (application to judges); Nancy A. Welsh, Mandatory Predispute
Consumer Arbitration, Structural Bias, and Incentivizing Procedural Safeguards, 42 SW. L. REV. 187, 197,
n. 60 (2012) (application to arbitration); Nancy A. Welsh, What Is (Im)Partial Enough in a World of
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to perceive the outcome as substantively fair (even if it is adverse to them)94 and comply
with that outcome.95 This is the particular concern with the Argentinean cases and
highlighted by many Latin American countries who threaten further noncompliance.
Furthermore, when the process itself is perceived as fair, parties will also perceive the
institution that provides or sponsors the process as legitimate.96
Procedural justice research is particularly important in the investment treaty
context where this dual concern in both the consent to the process (established by the
states in the ICSID structure) and then participation in the actual arbitration process.
States and investors need to perceive both the basis of the investment treaty initial
arbitration process as procedurally just as well as its decisions.97
A. Substantive Legitimacy—Confusion and Consent in the Legal Standards
Used
A clear concern arising from the Argentina cases is the lack of clarity over the use
of the emergency clause in the BIT and exactly to what extent state action should be
constrained by the rights of the foreign investor. Arguably, states would never have
agreed in advance that the rights of investors should trump their own ability to deal with
economic crises and protect their citizens. There is an ongoing dispute as to how to
interpret these emergency clauses within the treaties98 and to what extent international
law principles and the sense of public law concerns should determine the applicable law.
An understanding that the investor state arbitration system operates in both the public and
private realm is not necessarily agreed to or understood by all parties. Contrary to
international commercial arbitration, “the allegedly illegal action being disputed is
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generally state action.”99 As Burke-White and von Staden have explained, “investment
treaty arbitration still continues to operate as if it were purely private law . . . [and]
investment treaty arbitrators still apply standards of review developed from arbitration’s
private contract law origins. Today, these private law approaches are incompatible with
and inappropriate to investment treaty arbitration’s new public law functions.”100 Some
have characterized the investment treaty arbitration as a “comprehensive form of global
administrative law.”101 And, while historically investment treaty arbitration may have
dealt with traditional state action as expropriation or national treatment, this series of
cases from Argentina and elsewhere reach deeply into actions more closely tied to basic
regulatory and security rights of the state.102 The amount of damages awarded in these
cases is also a question of balancing state and investor interests.103 An ensuing concern
now arises in which changing this common understanding of the law—perhaps allowing
more ability to use emergency clauses—still leaves us with the question of how to
implement that change in a procedurally just manner.
B. Procedural Legitimacy–What Should the Standard of Review Be for the
Annulment Committees?
It is clear that arbitration, like other forms of adjudication, operate along a
continuum of values in which finality versus accuracy is weighed.104 For increased
accuracy in an adjudicative system, we would have repeated reviews and appeals of
decisions to make sure we get it right (arguably the way that, for example, death penalty
cases are handled). For increased finality, as is often the goal in arbitration, we structure
systems with very limited review over the decision.105 Ironically, the lack of an appeal
has been widely hailed as one of the important components in arbitration—it means that
an award is final and this reduces the cost of arbitrations.
In the context of ICSID, however, this lack of appeal has in fact added to the
uncertainty. The interesting thing is that, unlike appeals to a court, a successful
annulment results in the erasure of the original arbitral panel’s ruling. It is as if that
arbitral panel never existed. This means that the original case is now re-assigned to a
new arbitral tribunal and the entire proceedings start over. Rather than providing the
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finality or cost-savings that no-appeal is supposed to provide, the ICSID annulment
process can double the costs and draw out a decision for years.106
The lack of a working appeal process also has led to states blocking
implementation of awards at the state level through enforcement proceedings. Again,
Argentina provides the clearest example of using its own state courts to add a layer of
appeal. The federal Supreme Court of Argentina has held that “local courts could review
an arbitral award even when the parties involved have specifically agreed to waive the
right of appeal” to ensure that the award complies with Argentinean public policy.107
As we move forward in ICSID, this balance between accuracy versus finality is
evolving. And some commentators have raised the issue that stakeholders did not
consent to this evolution. As Baetens writes:
From a public international law point of view, particularly the Vienna
Convention rules on treaty interpretation with their focus on ‘object and
purpose of a treaty’, the question can be raised whether this extensive use
of the annulment option was at all foreseen and consented to by the States
when drafting, signing and ratifying the ICSID Convention. Specifically
the situation where an annulment decision condemns the original award
but leaves it standing [CMS] because it is not so deeply flawed that it
fulfills one of the five annulment thresholds of Article 52, erodes the
status of international investment law as a stable, reliable and predictable
legal system.108
Other commentators are instead concerned with the annulment committee’s overreaching
of its narrow procedural mandate. At either extreme, the contradictory approaches of
recent annulment committees raise the question of whether states have either explicitly or
implicitly agreed to how the annulment committees should operate and what standard of
review they should use.
In response to this concern, Professor Alec Stone Sweet outlines a standard of
proportionality that should be used by the ICSID annulment committees. As he notes,
106
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this standard of review is already used by General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) panels and the Appellate Body under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and
helps to balance the private and public interests.109 Professors Burke-White and von
Staden advocate for a “margin of appreciation” when reviewing state action.110 Von
Staden has more recently argued that “the democratic legitimacy of international courts
rises and falls with the extent to which the exercise of their review activities is based on a
defensible theory of the allocation of decision-making authority between the international
judiciary, on the one hand, and national decision-makers, on the other.”111
The issue of deference to arbitral awards exists in numerous contexts and is
particularly tricky in areas where we worry about structural bias.112 For example, in an
examination of the ERISA context, Professor Nancy Welsh has noted that the courts have
used the inherent structural bias that exists and made that a factor considered during
judicial review.113 Similarly, in the ICSID context, one could think about a standard of
review of arbitral tribunals that recognized concerns with power imbalances or structural
bias against public law concerns.114
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Other proposals to reform ICSID are structural. To fix the problems of
inconsistency and inaccuracy, many commentators have urged ICSID to adopt an
appellate body structure like that of the World Trade Organization (WTO).115 ICSID has
itself considered the addition of an appellate body.116 The WTO has a standing body
which hears appeals from any arbitral tribunal. This standing appellate body, after some
initial concern, has now been widely hailed as successful and crucial to maintaining the
WTO’s legitimacy among its member states.117
Another interesting reform would be to start referring cases to the International
Court of Justice (“ICJ”) or referring particular questions of international law to the ICJ
much like the reference process under the European Union.118 When a question of
international law arises, much like the issue in the Argentina cases about the proper scope
of the necessity defense, this question could be referred to the ICJ for clarification. Other
suggested reforms to address the problem of inconsistency include providing parties
better access to previous awards (now not generally widely shared), consolidation of
similarly-situated claims, and relying on jurisprudence from the academic community.119
If parties were, instead, to determine that finality in the ICSID process is the
primary goal, it is clear that annulment committees must refocus their review on the
procedure of the arbitral panel rather than on the substance of the decision. Professor
David Caron outlines five principles by which the annulment committee should operate:
(1) remember that annulment is exceptional since it denies the very existence of the
award; (2) the focus should be on the illegitimacy of the process, not the award; (3) the
task is not to amend the ICSID system; (4) the record should be as it was before the
tribunal; and (5) the committee should not decide more than is asked or say more than is
needed.120
C. Institutional Legitimacy and Sustainability—Who Participates in Reaching
an Updated Consensus?
Resolving these hard issues of both procedural and substantive legitimacy will
require stakeholders—states that belong to ICSID as well as municipalities, investors,
and their counsel—to be part of the conversation. Even the question of how international
law should apply is an issue where stakeholders will have important opinions. Professor
Lisa Bingham has noted:
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[i]n its best practice, dispute system design . . . uses inclusive,
participatory, stakeholder-driven processes to change existing or create
new dispute resolution structures.121
Stakeholders are likely to perceive procedural justice in this sort of “inclusive,
participatory” process only if they have an opportunity for serious consideration of their
concerns and are treated equally when the stakeholders either re-design or amend the
dispute resolution clause in an investment treaty.122
In other words, their perceptions of procedural justice will depend upon how their
participation is managed in any treaty or process change. Such perceptions will matter
because they will influence stakeholders’ perceptions regarding the substantive justice of
the treaty’s dispute resolution clause and prescription of particular procedures, the
likelihood of the stakeholders’ compliance with the treaty provisions and the legitimacy
of the states engaged in making the treaty. Instead, it appears as if the ICSID annulment
committees are in the process of creating law. Even if the outcomes of the annulment
committees are ones with which the state might agree (as in the annulment overturning
the award against Argentina), the process by which this change is occurring—through the
annulment committee—is not one in which stakeholders have a direct voice. This change
should be a legislative change in which the states agree on the law versus a judicial
change in which this interpretation is handed down.
It is clear moving forward that ICSID needs to improve its legitimacy in order to
remain sustainable. First, it needs a consensus on the applicable law in these hard cases.
The balance between international law, public law, and commercial law needs to be
struck. Second, ICSID needs to reach a new consensus on the goals of the annulment
committee procedure—whether this review should achieve uniformity, accuracy, or
finality—as it moves forward to either reconfigure this procedure into a standing body or
maintain the current structure. Finally, ICSID’s true legitimacy comes from this
consensus—where the stakeholders work to find this consensus rather than rely on the
annulment committees to create new law. This stakeholder participation will, in turn,
lead to more stability and legitimacy in the long run. We can predict that economic crises
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will occur. We can predict that states will act in necessary ways to protect their domestic
interests. What is open to debate at the moment is how the investor-state treaty system
can best address these disputes and strike a balance among these competing needs and
interests.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Argentine crisis and ensuing cases under the BIT with the U.S. has raised the
recurring issue of annulments under ICSID. While ICSID has faced charges of
inconsistency, error, and unfairness before, the plethora of cases from 2005 to the present
has raised the issue more starkly than ever. The result is a crisis of legitimacy. The
theory of error correction for judicial review can help shed light on why these decisions
were so frustrating and confusing for all stakeholders involved. Dispute system design
can provide guidance on both substantive and procedural legitimacy moving forward.
ICSID has the opportunity to rethink its structure and rules to build effectiveness;
including a wide variety of stakeholders in that decision-making ensures sustainability
into the future.
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